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problem description 
•  small user group (e.g. users of a proxy-server) 
•  all HTTP-requests are recorded 
•  changing IP-addresses / different surfing sessions 
Proxy-Server 
IP 1, User 1: www.wikipedia.de 
IP 2, User 2: www-sec.uni-r.de 
IP 2, User 2: www.cse.tkk.fi 
IP 1, User 1: www.google.de 
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perspective of a proxy server 
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perspective of a proxy server 
t 
Host 
Session 1: IP1 
Session 2: IP2 
Session 3: IP3 Session 4: IP4 
x 
x 
x 
x 
o 
o 
o 
o 
¤ 
¤ 
¤ 
¤ 
¤ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
x 
User 1 
User 2 
User 1? User 2? 
someone else? 
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perspective of a proxy server 
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modeling the classification problem 
(x11, x21, x32, x41) 
X4: www.google.de 
X3: www.cse.tkk.fi 
X2: www-sec.uni-r.de 
X1: www.wikipedia.de 
Session 4: IP4 
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•  each session (s) consists  
of a multiset 
 
•  each surfing session (s) is  
 an instance of a class 
 
•  each class represents an user 
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classification of user sessions 
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similarity to text-mining-problems 
•  word frequency and host frequency following a power-law 
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/introcs/data/bible.txt 
 text-retrieval user re-identification 
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host ranking 
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word ranking 
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text-mining toolbox 
•  multinomial naive bayes (MNB) 
 
 
 
 
 
•  vector transformations 
 
?  TF transformation 
  
?  IDF transformation 
 
?  cosine normalisation (N) 
cf. Manning Raghavan,Schütze: Introduction to  
Information Retrieval. Cambridge Press 2009. [21] 
Training Test 
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related work 
•  Pang et al. (2007) 
?  re-identification of users in 802.11 wireless networks 
•  Yang (2008) 
?  focus on fraud detection 
 
•  Kumpost (2009) 
?  focus on re-identification of web users 
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test setting and case study 
•  test users 
•  local proxy server 
•  host obfuscation 
•  client/server architecture 
 
 
 
key value 
participants 28 
duration of study in days 57 
number of HTTP requests 2,684,736 
number of unique hosts 25,124 
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data acquisition 
users scope of protection WWW 
local proxy-server 
HTTP-traffic to WWW 
host-obfuscation 
#1 
#2 
#n 
... 
study data 
aggregated 
study data 
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host obfuscation  
hash-function 
www.google.de 
<salt> 
134BC2D1F..0D 
serveral times repeated 
•  hashing of hostnames 
•  + salt to prevent dictionary attacks 
•  + iterations to prevent building of own dictionary 
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user contribution on a daily basis 
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user contribution on a daily basis 
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re-identification attack 
•  attacker's view 
?  limited knowledge 
?  practical relevance 
 
•  simulations  
?  for evaluating the driving factors 
 
•  countermeasures 
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attacker's view (training) 
•  Δt = 24h 
•  decision to track a specific user ut on day t 
•  training with Ut classes on day t with St sessions 
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attacker's view (attack) 
•  Δt = 24h 
•  decision to track a specific user ut on day t 
•  training with Ut classes on day t with St sessions 
•  on day t+1 assinging each session s to a class ut 
•  evaluating the classification result for class cu 
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prediction scheme of attacker's view 
correctly classified by proxy-server 
wrong classification – error is detectable for proxy-server 
wrong classification – error not detectable for proxy-server 
- attacker sucessfully recognizes the user    
- attacker sucessfully recognizes the absence of the user  
- more than one user was predicted to belong to class cu  
- attacker detects absence of user; but user was online 
- attacker wrongly recognizes the user 
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results from the attacker's view 
•  user re-identification works 
?  60.5% correctly classified sessions  
 
•  and can be improved by vector transformations 
?  73.1% by applying TF-N transformation 
 
•  further improvements are possible 
?  77.6% by 'learning' the user habbits  
 
•  more improvements conceivable 
?  timing-information 
?  filenames 
?  GET-parameters 
?  destination-ports 
?  ... 
? 
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results from the attacker's view 
•  user re-identification works 
?  60.5% correctly classified sessions  
 
•  and can be improved by vector normalization 
?  70.1% by applying TF-N transformation 
 
•  further improvements are possible 
?  77.6% by 'learning' the user habbits  
 
•  more improvements conceivable 
?  timing-information 
?  filenames 
?  GET-parameters 
?  destination-ports 
?  ... 
? 
none N IDF IDF-N TF TF-N TF-IDF TF-IDF-N 
60.5% 62.9% 65.0% 62.8% 56.0% 73.1% 66.1% 72.8% 
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results from the attacker's view 
•  user re-identification works 
?  60.5% correctly classified sessions  
 
•  and can be improved by vector transformations 
?  73.1% by applying TF-N transformation 
 
•  further improvements are possible 
?  77.6% by 'learning' the user habbits  
 
•  more improvements conceivable 
?  timing-information 
?  filenames 
?  GET-parameters 
?  destination-ports 
?  ... 
? 
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simulations  
•  simulation of simultaneously surfing sessions  
?  putting together the cronologically succeeding sessions 
?  always 28 users / session 
 
•  in each experiment one parameter was modified 
?  session duration 
?  number of simultaneous users 
?  offset between last training and first test session 
?  number of consecutive training instances 
 
•  each experiment was repeated 25 times 
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numer of simultaneous users 
•  the fewer simultaneous users the better it works  
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offset between test and training sessions 
•  each user tends to act similar at the same time of the day 
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number of training instances 
•  more training instances are better, but only few are needed 
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countermeasures 
•  using multiple, non-colluding proxy servers works 
?  but is not practicable (at this early stage) 
 
•  more distribution schemes conceivable 
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countermeasures 
•  analyzing a part of the host frequency distribution  
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countermeasures 
•  analyzing a part of the host frequency distribution  
?  keep the most popular hosts 
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countermeasures 
•  analyzing a part of the host frequency distribution  
?  keep the most popular hosts 
?  can not prevent from user re-identification 
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conclusion and discussion 
127.0.0.1 - frank [10/Oct/2000:13:55:36 -0700]  
"GET http://www.ab.com/index.html HTTP/1.0" 
200 2326 
127.0.0.1 - frank [10/Oct/2000:13:55:36 -0700]  
"GET http://www.ab.com/index.html HTTP/1.0" 
200 2326 
•  re-identification as a feasible attack 
•  evaluated on a privacy preserving case study 
 
•  works well for small closed groups 
•  not only for relevant for proxy-servers 
•   improvements in using context 
 information 
•  improvements in gathering  
more realistic sessions 
